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This weekly COVID-19 Health Evidence Summary is to signpost DFID and other UK government 
departments to the latest relevant evidence and discourse on COVID-19 to inform and support 
their response. 
1. Health Evidence Summary 
An interactive web-based dashboard to track COVID-19 in real time 
Dong, Du & Gardner | The Lancet Infectious Diseases | 19 February 2020 | Correspondence 
| User-friendly tool 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(20)30120-1 
An online interactive dashboard to visualise and track reported cases of COVID-19 in real-
time illustrating the location and number of confirmed COVID-19 cases, deaths and recoveries 
for all affected countries. Hosted by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) 
at Johns Hopkins University and first shared publicly on 22 January 2020. The case data 
reported aligns with the WHO situation reports and has reported newly infected countries 
ahead of WHO. Here is the direct link to the dashboard: 
https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd4029942
3467b48e9ecf6 
 
How will country-based mitigation measures influence the course 
of the COVID-19 epidemic? 
Anderson, Heesterbeek, Klinkenberg & Hollingsworth | The Lancet | 9 March 2020 | 
Comment 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30567-5 
Contains a useful figure of illustrative simulations of a transmission model of COVID-19. 
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Quarantine, social distancing, and isolation of infected populations has been shown by China 
to contain the epidemic, but it is unclear whether other countries can implement such stringent 
measures. Ongoing data collection and epidemiological analysis are essential in helping policy 
makers decide about mitigation strategies in a timely way that minimise morbidity and 
associated mortality, avoid an epidemic peak that overwhelms healthcare services and 
manages the effects on the economy. This is key to flattening the epidemic curve pushing the 
peak further into the future to provide time for the health services to treat cases and increase 
capacity, and longer-term, for vaccines and treatments to be developed.  
 
Individual behaviour will be crucial, and perhaps more important than government action, to 
control the spread of COVID-19. Key to the individual response will be early self-isolation, 
seeking medical advice remotely unless symptoms are severe, and social distancing. Key to 
the government response will be action on broader social distancing, good diagnostic facilities, 
remotely accessed health advice, and specialised treatment for people with severe disease.   
 
Contact tracing can be a successful strategy in the early stages of an outbreak, but the logistics 
of timely tracing on average 36 contacts per case are challenging and could be overwhelmed 
by super-spreading events. If prolonged contact is required for transmission (there is 
uncertainty in the duration of the infectious period), broad-scale social distancing is likely to 
be needed as this prevents transmission from symptomatic and non-symptomatic cases 
(currently unknown whether infectiousness starts before onset of symptoms). The case fatality 
rate (CFR) remains unknown in the absence of any completed large-scale serology surveys 
to detect specific antibodies to COVID-19 to define the number infected, but best estimates 
suggest a CFR of about 0.3-1%. Targeting social distancing to groups where CFR increases 
sharply with age and in people with COVID-19 and underlying comorbidities maybe the most 
effective way to reduce morbidity and concomitant mortality. School closure is unlikely to be 
effective given the apparent low rate of infection among children, although data are scare. 
Data from the southern hemisphere will help evaluate how much seasonality will influence 
COVID-19 transmission. 
 
Critical preparedness, readiness and response actions for COVID-
19 
WHO | 7 March 2020 | Technical interim guidance 
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/20200307-cccc-guidance-table-covid-
19-final.pdf?sfvrsn=1c8ee193_10 
This document provides technical guidance for government authorities, health workers, and 
other key stakeholders to guide preparedness, readiness and response actions for COVID-19 
for four transmission scenarios – no cases, sporadic cases, clusters of cases and community 
transmission – recognising that there is no one-size-fits all approach to managing cases and 
outbreaks of COVID-19. It will be updated as new information or technical guidance become 
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available. For countries that are already preparing or responding, this document can also 
serve as a checklist to identify any remaining gaps. All technical guidance can be found here: 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance 
 
COVID-19: the gendered impacts of the outbreak 
Wenham, Smith & Morgan on behalf of the Gender and COVID-19 Working Group | The 
Lancet | 6 March 2020 | Comment 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)30526-2 
Experience from previous outbreaks highlights the importance of including gender analysis 
into preparedness and response efforts to improve the effectiveness of health interventions, 
to understand the primary and secondary effects of a health emergency on different individuals 
and communities and for creating effective, equitable policies and interventions. Yet currently 
there is no known gender analysis of the COVID-19 outbreak by global health institutions or 
governments in affected countries or in preparedness phases. Current sex-disaggregated 
data are incomplete, cautioning against early assumptions. Consideration needs to be given 
to the gender implications of school closures, travel restrictions, quarantine, diverted health 
resources and caregiving roles. The authors ask for women to be represented at all levels of 
decision-making and given a voice including recognising the importance of their role and 
knowledge on the front line for early surveillance and response. 
 
The species Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related 
coronavirus: classifying 2019-nCoV and naming it SARS-CoV-2 
Gorbalenya, A.E., Baker, S.C., Baric, R.S. et al. | Nature Microbiology | 2 March 2020 | 
Consensus statement 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41564-020-0695-z 
COVID-19 is a sister clade to SARS-CoVs and has been designated as SARS-COV-2 by the 
Coronaviridae Study Group (CSG) of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses, 
responsible for developing the classification of viruses and taxon nomenclature of the family 
Coronaviridae. For clear communication, the CSG proposes to use the following naming 
convention for individual isolates: SARS- CoV-2/host/location/isolate/date. The current 
outbreak is the third of an animal coronavirus spill over to humans in only two decades. The 
authors highlight that the independent zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 
calls for research of the viruses at the species level as well as research of the individual 
pathogenic virus of immediate significance to better prepare for future outbreaks.  
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Feasibility of controlling COVID-19 outbreak by isolation of cases 
and contacts 
Hellewell et al. | The Lancet | 28 February 2020 | Article 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(20)30074-7 
From mathematical modelling, highly effective contact tracing and case isolation is enough to 
control a new outbreak of COVID-19 within 3 months in most scenarios. Longs delays from 
symptom onset to isolation, fewer cases found through contact tracing and increasing 
transmission before symptoms would decrease the probability of control. The model can be 
modified to respond to updated transmission characteristics and more specific definitions of 
outbreak control. 
 
Report of the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus Disease 
2019 (COVID-19)  
WHO-China Joint Mission | 16-24 February 2020 | Report 
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-
final-report.pdf 
This report informs national (China) and international planning on the next steps in the 
response to the ongoing outbreak of COVID-19 and on the next steps in readiness and 
preparedness for geographic areas not yet affected. Major findings are described on the virus, 
the outbreak, transmission dynamics, disease progression and severity, the China response 
and knowledge gaps. 
 
Persistence of coronavirus on inanimate surfaces and their 
inactivation with biocidal agents 
G. Kampf, D. Todt, S. Pfaender, E. Steinmann | Journal of Hospital Infection | 6 February 2020 
| Review 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhin.2020.01.022 
The review analyses 22 studies about the persistence of human and veterinary coronaviruses 
on inanimate surfaces and inactivation strategies with biocidal agents used for chemical 
disinfection. Human coronaviruses such as SARS, MERS or endemic human coronaviruses 
(HCoV) can persist on inanimate surfaces like metal, glass or plastic for up to 9 days, but can 
be efficiently inactivated within 1 minute by surface disinfection with 62-71% ethanol, 0.5% 
hydrogen peroxide or 0.1% sodium hypochlorite. Note that other biocidal agents such as 
0.05%-0.2% benzalkonium chloride or 0.02% chlorhexidine digluconate are less effective.  
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Coronavirus action plan 
UK government | 3 March 2020 | Policy Paper 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/coronavirus-action-plan 
This plan outlines four phases of action – contain, delay, research and mitigate. The prime 
minister is chairing an emergency Cobra meeting on 9 March to decide whether the UK will 
move to the delay phase. 
 
Retraction – Chinese medical staff request international medical 
assistance in fighting against COVID-19 
The Editors | The Lancet Global Health | 26 February 2020 | Correspondence 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(20)30076-0 
The Lancet Global Health have retracted this Correspondence on learning that the account 
described therein was not a first-hand account, as the authors had claimed.  
2. Resource Hubs 
WHO: Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019 
The Lancet COVID-19 Resource Centre 
https://www.thelancet.com/coronavirus 
Elsevier’s Novel Coronavirus Information Center 
https://www.elsevier.com/connect/coronavirus-information-center 
Cell Press Coronavirus Resource Hub 
https://www.cell.com/2019-nCOV 
The BMJ Coronavirus (covid-19): Latest news and resources 
https://www.bmj.com/coronavirus?int_source=wisepops&int_medium=wisepops&int_campai
gn=DAA_CoronaVirus_Jan24 
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About this report 
This weekly COVID-19 health evidence summary is based on half-a-day of desk-based research. K4D services 
are provided by a consortium of leading organisations working in international development, led by the Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS), with Education Development Trust, Itad, University of Leeds Nuffield Centre for 
International Health and Development, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM), University of Birmingham 
International Development Department (IDD) and the University of Manchester Humanitarian and Conflict 
Response Institute (HCRI). 
This evidence summary was prepared for the UK Government’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and its partners in support of pro-poor programmes. It is licensed for non-
commercial purposes only. K4D cannot be held responsible for errors, omissions or any 
consequences arising from the use of information contained in this health evidence summary. 
Any views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, K4D or any other 
contributing organisation.  
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